






CPD Occasional Paper Series 
 
 
Exchange Rate Policy of Bangladesh: 




























                                                                                                      Price Tk. 20.00 
 
 
        Centre for Policy Dialogue 
House No 40/C, Road No 11 (new), Dhanmondi R/A, Dhaka-1209 
Mailing Address: GPO Box 2129, Dhaka 1209, Bangladesh 
           Tel: (880 2) 8124770, 9141703. 9141734; Fax: (880 2) 8130951 
                          E-mail: cpd@bdonline.com; Website: www.cpd-bangladesh.org
 
January, 2003 
 The Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), established in 1993, is a civil society initiative to 
promote an ongoing dialogue between the principal partners in the decision-making and 
implementing process. The dialogues are designed to address important policy issues and to 
seek constructive solutions to these problems. The Centre has already organised a series of 
such dialogues at local, regional and national levels. The CPD has also organised a number of 
South Asian bilateral and regional dialogues as well as some international dialogues. These 
dialogues have brought together ministers, opposition frontbenchers, MPs, business leaders, 
NGOs, donors, professionals and other functional groups in civil society within a non-
confrontational environment to promote focused discussions. The CPD seeks to create a 
national policy consciousness where members of civil society will be made aware of critical 
policy issues affecting their lives and will come together in support of particular policy 
agendas which they feel are conducive to the well being of the country. 
 
In support of the dialogue process the Centre is engaged in research programmes which are 
both serviced by and are intended to serve as inputs for particular dialogues organised by 
the Centre throughout the year.  Some of the major research programmes of CPD include 
The Independent Review of Bangladesh's Development (IRBD), Governance and 
Development, Population and Sustainable Development, Trade Policy Analysis and 
Multilateral Trading System and Leadership Programme for the Youth. The CPD also 
carries out periodic public perception surveys on policy issues and developmental concerns. 
    
Dissemination of information and knowledge on critical developmental issues continues to 
remain an important component of CPD’s activities. Pursuant to this CPD maintains an 
active publication programme, both in Bangla and in English. As part of its dissemination 
programme, CPD has decided to bring out CPD Occasional Paper Series on a regular 
basis. Dialogue background papers, investigative reports and results of perception surveys 
which relate to issues of high public interest will be published under its cover. The 
Occasional Paper Series will also include draft research papers and reports, which may be 
subsequently published by the CPD. 
 
The present paper titled Exchange Rate Policy of Bangladesh: Not Floating Does Not 
Mean Sinking has been prepared by Dr Mirza Azizul Islam, Fellow, CPD and  former 
Director, UNESCAP, Bangkok. The paper was presented at a dialogue on the theme of Full 
Float Of Taka: Is Bangladesh Ready For It? organised by the Centre  held at CIRDAP 
Auditorium, Dhaka on January 2, 2003.  
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Exchange Rate Policy of Bangladesh:  






Media reports suggest that Bangladesh is under intense pressure by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) to change its prevailing exchange rate regime to one in which the 
nominal exchange rate will be determined primarily, if not solely, by the market forces of 
demand for and supply of foreign exchange. There are also indications that the Government 
is willing to comply once the foreign exchange reserve situation improves. In light of these 
developments, this paper seeks to examine if there exists any strong justification to opt for 
the change that the IMF has been apparently insisting upon. 
 
The first section of the paper briefly describes the present exchange rate regime in 
Bangladesh. The second section draws upon literature on the subject to identify the general 
economic characteristics suitable for alternative exchange rate regimes and indicates the 
preferred option for Bangladesh in that light. The third section briefly reviews the 
experiences of some of the countries in the region that undertook major changes in their 
exchange rate regimes in recent years and the implications of these experiences for   
Bangladesh. The fourth section evaluates the performance of the present exchange rate 
regime of Bangladesh in terms of the key economic objectives that an exchange rate regime 
is expected to promote. The paper ends with concluding observations that summarise the 








Exchange rate regime of Bangladesh can be characterised as one of adjustable basket peg 
using a real effective exchange rate target. Given an existing nominal exchange rate, the 
corresponding real effective exchange rate is estimated. If it is observed that the real 
effective exchange rate (REER) as estimated on the basis of current par value significantly 
diverges from the desired or targeted REER, corrective response is initiated in the form of 
changing the nominal exchange rate. 
 
The estimation of REER involves three steps. The first is the calculation of bilateral 
nominal exchange rates (NER) of the country under consideration, i (Bangladesh), with its 
trading partner country, j. In the case of Bangladesh, nominal exchange rates are usually 
announced in terms of United States dollar ($) and data on exchange rates of trading 
partners are also available in terms of dollar. Thus, bilateral exchange rates are calculated 
by using the following formula: 
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 NERij  = 
$ NERj
$ NERi
….  …..  …. …. ….   (1) 
 
Where NER i j stands for bilateral nominal exchange rate of Bangladesh with the trading 
partner j; NER i $ for Bangladesh’s exchange rate with dollar and NER j $ for the trading 
partners’ exchange rate with dollar. 
 
The second step involves estimation of bilateral real exchange rates. This is based on the 
following equation: 
 
  RER i j    =  NER i j  
Pi
Pj
  …. …  …. (2) 
where RER i j is the bilateral real exchange rate of Bangladesh with trading partner j; Pj is 
the price index of the trading partner and Pi is the price index of Bangladesh. REER is 
finally estimated as per following: 
 
 REER   =  ∑W i j RER i j    ….  …  …  (3) 
 
where W i j stands for the share of the trading partners in Bangladesh’s trade and ∑W i j=1. 
As already noted, if the actual REER is found to be substantially different from the desired 
or targeted level, NER would be changed to reach that level. Then, the question arises as to 
what level or REER is deemed desirable and targeted. 
 
Ideally, targeted REER should approximate the equilibrium exchange rate. However, 
estimating the equilibrium exchange rate that ensures healthy external balance as well as 
desirable levels of domestic economic aggregates is a complex and arduous task. This can 
not be routinely done. It is learnt that the authorities in Bangladesh monitor the movements 
of the REER compared to some base year and also qualitatively take into account several 
other domestic and external sector variables in determining the targeted REER. The external 
variables include the level of international reserves, current account gap, trends of exchange 
rate changes in the local inter - bank foreign exchange market and trends in the exchange 
rates of major neighbouring trade partners (India and Pakistan). Domestic variables include 
the domestic inflation rate, credit growth in the private and public sector, and the growth of 
broad money and liquidity. 
 
The exchange rate policy decisions, though notified in all cases by the Bangladesh Bank, 
are made on behalf of and in close consultation with the Ministry of Finance. Bangladesh 
Bank is not in the role of independent stewardship of exchange rate policy. 
 
The Bangladesh Bank supports the current parity of Taka through a continuous presence in 
the market in the form of announced readiness to undertake United States dollar purchases 
and sales at rates decided by itself within the declared rate band (currently of one Taka 
width) any time an authorised dealer approaches. Any adjustment in the parity is 
implemented through the announcement by the Bangladesh Bank of a revised band for 
buying and selling rates following which the dealers adjust their rates for transactions with 
their customers and among themselves. Previously, Bangladesh Bank used to announce 
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specified buying and selling rates. From 3
rd December 2000 Bangladesh Bank adopted the 
practice of declaring a 50 paisa band within which buying and selling transactions were to 
be undertaken; this band was widened to Taka 1.00 from 25
th May 2001. 
 
Prima facie, Bangladesh pursues an active exchange rate policy. This activism is reflected 
in the frequency of nominal exchange rate changes announced by the Central Bank. From 
1983 onwards, there have been as many as 89 adjustments in the exchange rate of which 83 
were downwards and only six were upward. However, the behaviour of economic agents is 
influenced by the impact of policy changes on the real variables that affect them. In the 
present context, the relevant variable is the real effective exchange rate. Table-1 shows the 
relationship between the nominal exchange rate and the real effective exchange rate during 
the past twelve years. 
 
Data in table-1 suggest that up until 1998, the authorities were basically pursuing a policy of 
stable REER. Thus between 1991 and 1998, REER depreciated by a mere 5 percent. The 
subsequent years were marked by stronger depreciations. The mild appreciation of REER in 
1998 could be one factor that encouraged policy makers to be more active in exchange rate 
policy arena. Another factor could be that some of the competitor neighbouring countries 
were apparently depreciating faster. 
 
TABLE 1 : INDICES OF NER AND REER (1991 = 100) 
 
 
Year  NER  NER index  REER index 
1991 36.60 100.0 100.0 
1992 38.95 106.6 100.2 
1993 39.57 108.1 104.6 
1994 40.21 109.9 102.2 
1995 40.28 110.1 102.9 
1996 41.79 114.2 103.8 
1997 43.89 119.9 105.5 
1998 46.91 128.2 105.4 
1999 48.00 131.4 112.8 
2000 52.00 142.1 116.2 
Source: Based on unpublished data from Bangladesh Bank. 
 
 
III. CHARACTERISTICS SUITABLE FOR ALTERNATIVE REGIMES 
 
 
It should be stressed at the outset that the task of identifying economic characteristics that 
dictate the choice of one regime or the other is enormously difficult. The difficulty arises 
due to several reasons. Much of the literature identifies these characteristics from the stand 
point of two polar policy regimes. One of these can be branded as a regime of "hard peg"  
in which the value of the local currency is irrevocably fixed in terms of one or more foreign 
currencies. On the other extreme lies the regime of "free float" under which exchange rate 
is allowed to fluctuate freely in response to market forces of demand for and supply of 
foreign exchange.  The actual practice of either of these regimes is rare. There is a   host of 
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other regimes which lie in between, variously labelled as "managed float", "independent 
float ", "peg with sliding or crawling band","flexible peg" etc. 
 
The second difficulty arises from the fact that no single exchange rate regime is appropriate 
for all countries in view of differences in levels of economic and financial development and 
other aspects of their economic situation. Moreover, the regime that is appropriate for a 
particular country may change over time (Mussa, et.al., 2000). 
 
The third difficulty is that the sustainability of a regime is also conditioned by the capacity 
of a country to formulate and effectively implement other economic policies which can 
reinforce the beneficial impact of a particular regime and neutralise the negative 
consequences. In particular, the credibility and the flexibility of monetary and fiscal policies 
are of crucial importance. 
 
Notwithstanding the above difficulties, it is worthwhile to examine the economic 
characteristics that point to the appropriateness of a particular regime as benchmarks. These 
can be useful indicators for the choice of a regime in Bangladesh. 
 
There is a vast literature on the choice of exchange rate regime.
1 The conditions that 
generally point to the appropriateness of some form of pegged exchange rate regime are 
briefly discussed below. 
 
•  The degree of involvement with international capital markets is low. This condition 
ensures that the exchange rate will not be subject to severe pressure because of volatile 
inflows and outflows of short-term capital. Bangladesh clearly satisfies this criterion 
with a wide range of controls on capital and money market instruments, credit 
operations of the commercial banks, and transactions related to foreign direct 
investment and real estate. 
 
•  The share of trade with the country/countries to which its currency is pegged is high. As 
has been explained in the preceding section, this condition is fully met in Bangladesh as 
it follows a policy of trade-weighted basket peg. 
 
•  The shocks it faces are similar to those facing the country/countries to which it is 
pegged. With stringent capital controls in place, the external shocks to Bangladesh 
economy are transmitted primarily through the trade channel. In light of the point made 
above, this condition also holds for Bangladesh. 
 
•  Exchange rate based stabilisation is considered attractive for the country. Given that 
there are lots of endogenous pressures from political and economic interest groups in 
Bangladesh to be lax in the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies, some sort of a 
pegged exchange rate the maintenance of which forces monetary and fiscal discipline  
appears to be a desirable nominal anchor for Bangladesh. 
 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Mussa et.al. (2000); Velasco (2000) and the references cited in footnote 18 of Mussa, et.al. 
(2000). 
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•  The country is wiling to give up its monetary policy independence and largely follow 
the monetary policy of the partner country. This condition is specially relevant for 
countries which pursue a policy of hard peg vis a vis a single currency. Since 
Bangladesh follows a policy of basket peg and the peg itself is adjustable, Bangladesh 
does not have to sacrifice its monetary policy independence entirely and blindly imitate 
another country’s monetary policy stance. 
 
•  The country has high international reserves. This is an important requirement for a 
pegged exchange rate regime that Bangladesh does not adequately meet. However, the 
rationale for high international reserves under a pegged exchange rate regime arises 
from the fact that should the exchange rate come under pressure the authorities must 
have adequate foreign exchange to intervene effectively in the market to maintain the 
pegged rate. This condition does not appear to be an indomitable constraint for the 
present exchange rate policy in Bangladesh as the authorities can exercise two options, 
in addition to domestic policy instruments, to ease off pressure in the foreign exchange 
market. First, exchange control regime can be tightened subject to obligations under 
Article VIII of the  IMF Articles of Agreement. Second, the peg itself can be adjusted, 
as has been done many times over the years. 
 
The above discussion already suggests that some sort of a pegged exchange rate regime may 
be the preferred option  for Bangladesh. At this point it is worthwhile to examine how does 
Bangladesh figure in terms of economic or institutional requirements of a floating exchange 
rate regime. 
 
The literature on the subject clearly highlights the need for a credible alternative nominal 
anchor for the conduct of monetary as well as fiscal policies as the exchange rate fails to 
provide such an anchor under the floating regime. The alternative anchor that is most often 
suggested is inflation targeting. Under the inflation targeting system, a country is committed 
to keep inflation within a predetermined target rate. Monetary and fiscal policies have to be 
tuned to ensure that the target is not violated. This in turn requires an independent central 
bank which can refuse accommodation to the Government if it is apprehended that the 
latter’s fiscal stance is likely to cause inflation beyond the targeted rate. Furthermore, the 
central bank should have the independence to conduct monetary policy in such a manner 
that constrains the Government from financing deficit through the commercial banks and 
other ways which may have inflationary consequences. Apart from the requirement of legal 
independence, the central bank also needs to be staffed by highly competent professionals 
who can predetermine an appropriate target rate of inflation, monitor the actual behaviour of 
inflation and implement systematic adjustments in monetary policy instruments to ensure 
that the target is realised in practice. No one would seriously doubt that these institutional 
imperatives for the success of inflation targeting are unlikely to be met in the near future in 
Bangladesh. Another major problem that Bangladesh is likely to face in this area is that, to a 
large extent, inflation is most likely caused in Bangladesh by supply shocks. In particular, 
the natural calamities have an important bearing on food prices, a major component of 
inflation in Bangladesh. This complicates the task of predicting the behaviour of inflation 
and also of controlling it through monetary policy instruments. 
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Another requirement for a floating exchange rate regime is that the country should have a 
deep and a competitive foreign exchange market. If the market is thin and controlled by a 
small number of operators, free float will inevitably lead to a large degree of volatility. This 
is likely to inhibit trade as well as investment (both local and foreign) due to greater 
exposure of  economic agents to exchange rate risks. In principle, it can be argued that such 
risk can be hedged. In practice, this possibility would be of limited relevance for 
Bangladesh, given the facts that (a) the foreign exchange market of the country is pretty thin 
even for spot transactions and (b) no organised markets for currency futures and options 
exist. In the circumstances of Bangladesh where non-residents are unwilling to hold local 
currency exposure, there will be no net capacity to shift foreign exchange risks abroad at a 
reasonable price. Therefore, any hedging under a floating exchange rate would basically 
involve shifting of exchange rate risks of one domestic economic agent to another domestic 
agent. 
 
A well-regulated, well-supervised and financially sound banking system is also a crucial 
requirement for a floating exchange rate regime, particularly so if one of the objectives 
behind the adoption of floating exchange rate regime is to substantially open up capital 
account. With the opening of capital accounts, banks play a critical role in intermediating 
short-term capital flows. If the inflows are not invested appropriately, the exchange rate 
may come under indefensible speculative attack with disastrous consequences for the 
economy, as was the case with the East –South-East Asian economies in 1997. Appropriate 
investment of short-term external capital inflows has to satisfy at least two conditions. First, 
maturity mismatch has to be prevented. This means the time profile of income stream 
generated by investment has to broadly correspond to that of repayment obligations. 
Second, currency mismatch has to be avoided. There arises a currency mismatch if most of 
the income from investment is generated in local currency with repayment obligations 
inevitably denominated in foreign currency. One need not belabour the point that the 
banking system of Bangladesh would be simply incapable of meeting these stringent 
requirements of an open capital account. 
 
Finally, the requirement of high international reserves under the pegged exchange rate 
regime is of no less relevance to the floating exchange rate regime either. The reason is that 
the authorities can not remain as idle onlookers when the exchange rate fluctuates wildly. 
The experience of developing countries worldwide (in some cases even developed 
countries) shows that authorities can not avoid intervening in foreign exchange markets 
under floating regimes in order to maintain a reasonable degree of stability in the exchange 
rate. The need for intervention may be even stronger for Bangladesh with its thin foreign 
exchange market which typically implies greater fluctuations. This is precisely the reason  
why the Finance Minister has pronounced many times that he would consider the adoption 
of floating exchange rate only after the country acquires a high level of reserves. 
 
The upshot of the above arguments is that the ex-ante requirements for the adoption of a 
floating exchange rate regime are not satisfied in Bangladesh. Thus, the justification for a 
change in the present exchange rate regime is by no means obvious. 
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IV. EXPERIENCES OF OTHER COUNTRIES 
 
 
The experiences of some countries in the region which implemented major changes in their 
exchange rate regimes in recent years can provide useful lessons for Bangladesh. This 
section begins with a brief review of the experiences of the five East/South-East Asian 
Countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Republic of Korea and Thailand) all of which 
adopted independently floating exchange rate regime following the Asian crisis in the 




The review here is concerned primarily with the comparison of exchange rate volatility 
before and after the crisis. It is well known that, before the crisis, these countries were 
basically pursuing pegged exchange rate policies though their regimes (with the exception 
of Thailand which officially had a pegged rate) were officially branded as managed float. 
The post crisis period is defined as 24 month period beginning January 1999 and the pre-
crisis period  is defined as 24-month period ending in June 1997. Thus the period of extreme 
instability resulting from the crisis is left out of account. The magnitudes of exchange rate 
variations are captured in the following table. 
 
 
TABLE 2: MONTHLY EXCHANGE RATE PERCENTAGE CHANGES 
 
Country Period  Range  Standard  deviation 
Indonesia Pre-crisis  .033  .007 
 Post-crisis .230  .063 
Malaysia Pre-crisis  .027  .007 
 Post-crisis .000  .000 
Republic of Korea  Pre-crisis  .043  .011 
 Post-crisis .066  .017 
Philippines Pre-crisis  .012  .003 
 Post-crisis .068  .017 
Thailand Pre-crisis  .016  .004 
 Post-crisis .070  .018 
Source: Hernandez and Montiel, 2001. 
 
Table 2 makes it abundantly clear that all the countries experienced much greater volatility 
in their exchange rates as they switched to floating regimes. And this happened despite the 
fact that they did not refrain from intervening in foreign exchange market as well as using 
domestic policies to stabilise the exchange rates. 
 
Greater volatility and sharper depreciation have also been the experiences of South Asian 
countries which adopted some sort of floating exchange rate regimes in recent years. India 
adopted a unified exchange rate system in March 1993 in which the exchange rate is 
                                                 
2 This review draws heavily from Hernandedez and Montiel (2001) 
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determined by the supply and demand condition in the interbank foreign exchange market. 
The country’s exchange rate remained fairly stable till August 1995, but then there was a 
sharp depreciation against the dollar by 12 per cent by the end of  1995. There was again a 
sharp depreciation by about 15 per cent between September 1997 and July 1998. By 
November 2001, there was a further depreciation by about 13 percent and Rupee/dollar 
exchange rate was 48.0. 
 
The adoption of floating/flexible regime has not freed the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the 
central bank of India, from intervening in the foreign exchange market. In fact, taking note 
of the fact that the thinness of the foreign exchange market as well as some large 
transactions can cause excessive volatility, RBI pursues an explicit policy of intervention in 
the spot market and also undertakes both forward and swap transactions in support of its 
exchange rate objectives. 
 
Pakistan can be considered to have adopted a sort of floating exchange rate policy since July 
2000 when the exchange rate band was abandoned. Between November 2000 and 2001, the 
exchange rate depreciated from Rupees 57.5 to Rupees 60.9 per US dollar. Exchange rate 
volatility was relatively high between mid – 1998 until October 1999 when the fixed peg 
was adopted for a brief period. With the adoption of the floating system, volatility   
increased again to pre-peg level. 
 
The State Bank of Pakistan also intervenes in foreign exchange market. The interventions 
take the form of outright sales/purchases of foreign exchange, swap transactions and 
provision of foreign exchange to banks to cover certain bulky imports. 
 
Sri Lanka adopted a free float on 23 January 2001. Immediately after the float, there arose 
considerable volatility. The currency fell drastically in two days following the float to as 
low as Rs 98/$ compared to Rs. 79/$ in November 2000. This forced the authorities to 
intervene in support of the currency and introduce stringent control measures so as to 
restore the currency to Rs. 87/$ by about March 2001. As of November 2001, the rupee 
depreciated to Rs. 93/$. 
 
The volatility and the sharp depreciation in Sri Lanka occurred inspite of putting in place 
precautionary foreign exchange regulations in conjunction with the float. Those regulations, 
inter alia, imposed limits on banks’ daily net foreign exchange exposure; enjoined banks to 
ensure settlement of export credit by using export proceeds within 90 days (later extended 
to 120 days) and to impose penalties for overdue settlements; introduced restrictions and 
deposit requirements for banks’ forward sales of foreign exchange and prohibited 
prepayment of import bills. The country also has a set of detailed guidelines for dealing in 
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This section examines the performance of Bangladesh in terms of certain key objectives that 
an exchange rate regime is expected to promote. The relevant objectives are : (a) the 
prevention of any major misalignment of exchange rate and, in particular, the prevention of 
appreciation of the real effective exchange rate which can hurt exports; (b) the promotion of 
exports and containment of current account deficit; (c) moderation of inflation; and (d) 
enhancement of remittances – a matter of special concern for Bangladesh, given that the 
remittances financed a significant portion of the country’s trade deficit throughout the 1990s 
(Islam, 2002). 
 
(a)  Misalignment of Exchange Rate 
 
The prevention of misalignment implies that the actual exchange rate should correspond to 
the estimate of equilibrium exchange rate. It is not easy to either define the equilibrium 
exchange rate or to estimate it. That would be a complex exercise in itself and is beyond the 
scope of the present paper. However, a recent study has undertaken such an exercise for 
Bangladesh (ADB, 2002,a). The study concludes that the misalignment between the actual 
and equilibrium exchange rate for the period 1997 to 2001 has been small and has 
progressively narrowed since 1998. During 2001, the misalignment was only 2.2 per cent. 
 
It will also be recalled from table 1 that exchange rate policy certainly succeeded in 
preventing appreciation of the real effective exchange rate throughout the 1990s. In fact 
there has been more or less consistent depreciation of REER, the index rising to 116.2 in the 
year 2000 with 1991 as the base year. There was only one year, 1994, in which there was 
any noticeable appreciation and in that year the index fell to 102.2 compared to 104.6 in the 
preceding year. 
 
It can thus be concluded that the exchange rate regime has avoided any major misalignment 
in the exchange rate. 
 
(b)  Exports and Current Account Balance 
 
Table 3 provides the perspective on export performance of Bangladesh in comparison with 
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1990 – 1999    2000 –2001
a
Bangladesh 13.2    10.3 
      
India 11.3    9.3 
      
Pakistan 2.7    8.9 
      
Sri Lanka  8.4    3.5 
Source:  World Bank, 2001 and ADB, 2002 b. 
a Relates to Merchandise Exports Only 
 
It is evident from table 3 that Bangladesh has performed better than the other major South 
Asian countries. However, improved export performance can not be the sole objective of 
exchange rate policy. What happens to the overall current account balance is an important 
consideration. Table 4 presents data on current account deficit. 
 




1997   1998   1999  2000   2001 
              
Bangladesh  2.1   1.1   1.4  1.0   2.1 
India  1.3   1.0   1.1  0.6   0.5 
Pakistan  6.4   3.2   4.1  1.9   0.9 
Sri  Lanka  2.6   1.4   3.6  6.5   3.4 
    Source: ADB, 2002 b 
 
It is quite clear that Bangladesh’s achievement in terms of containing current account deficit 
is by no means unsatisfactory. It has done consistently better than Sri Lanka, and better than 
Pakistan in all the recent years excepting 2001. The only country with which Bangladesh 
compares somewhat unfavourably is India, but that should not come as a surprise even to a 




Experience shows that countries have developed with different degrees of inflation 
Nevertheless, a consensus has emerged that high and unstable inflation rates are not 
conducive to development. High inflation reduces return to savers and thus acts as a 
disincentive to save and invest. In particular, saving in financial form is likely to be 
discouraged.  This complicates the task of mobilis  
Dhaka ing savings for productive investment. The viability of financial and capital market 
institutions which act as crucial intermediaries between savers and investors is impaired. 
High inflation is also likely to distort the pattern of investment in favour of real estate, gold 
or other forms of property as hedging devices without adding much to an economy’s 
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productive capacity. The international competitiveness of the economy is badly eroded by 
inflation. It generally encourages capital flight, exacerbates income distribution, gives rise 
to inequities in income distribution and aggravates poverty. Last but not the least, a high 
rate of inflation seriously undermines the popularity of the government. 
 
The discussion of inflation in the context of exchange rate regime becomes relevant because 
of  two major considerations. First, a change in the exchange rate is almost certain to cause 
a change in the domestic prices of tradables. Second, the prices of  non-tradables are also 
likely to be affected because the non-tradables often use tradable inputs and the demand 
switch generated by initial change in the exchange rate may not elicit corresponding supply 
response from the non-tradable sector to leave prices unchanged. 
 
In the backdrop of the above arguments, it is useful to look at the performance of 
Bangladesh in respect of inflation. The relevant data are presented in the following table. 
 
 





1996 1997 1998 1999  2000  2001 
Bangladesh  6.6 2.5 7.0 8.9  3.4  1.6 
India  4.6 4.4 5.9 3.3  7.2  4.7 
Pakistan 10.4  11.3  7.8  5.7  3.6  4.4 
Sri Lanka  14.6  7.1  6.9  5.9  1.2  11.0 
South Asian 
average 
5.8 5.2 6.3 4.2  6.2  4.6 
Source : ADB, 2002 b 
 
 
It is obvious from the data that Bangladesh has done reasonably well in terms of inflation 
criterion. During the past decade, its inflation rate never reached double-digit level. In every 
year except 1999, the inflation rate in Bangladesh has been comparable to or lower than the 




As noted before, remittances by Bangladeshi workers employed abroad play an important 
role in moderating the country’s trade deficit. The country’s performance in respect of 
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a Number of persons  Remittances  
(Million $) 
1991 96,691 763.91 
1992 185,106 849.66 
1993 237,779 944.57 
1994 192,263  1088.72 
1995 199,925  1197.63 
1996 181,462  1217.06 
1997 227,584  1475.42 
1998 242,811  1525.43 
1999 270,390  1705.74 
2000 248,291  1949.32 
2001 213,339  1882.10 
2002 (July to March)  139,000  1811.10 
Source:  Bangladesh Bank, 2002 and Ministry of Finance, 2002 
a 
FY 1990-91 is defined as 1991. 
 
The above table shows that remittances in dollar terms have maintained an uninterrupted 
upward trend. There was only a minor blip in 2001. 
 
The discussion in this section makes it abundantly clear that the performance of Bangladesh 
in terms of certain key objectives that an exchange rate regime is expected to promote has 
been quite satisfactory. In the minimum, therefore, it can be stated that the present exchange 
rate regime of Bangladesh has served the country reasonably well. 
 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The principal findings of the paper and their implications are summarised below: 
 
•  Bangladesh pursues an active exchange rate policy in the framework of a regime that 
can be characterised as one of adjustable basket peg. 
 
•  By and large, the country satisfies the conditions which justify the adoption of some sort 
of pegged exchange rate regime. 
 
•  In contrast, the economic and institutional prerequisites of a floating exchange rate 
regime are not met in Bangladesh. 
 
•  The experiences of other countries in the region show that floating regime generates 
greater volatility in exchange rates. The attendant uncertainty is likely to affect 
adversely the overall trade and investment climate which is already afflicted by many 
unfavourable elements in Bangladesh. 
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•  The experiences of other countries also show that a floating regime does not eliminate 
the need for intervention in foreign exchange market. Given the thinness of the market 
in Bangladesh, the need for intervention may be even greater in Bangladesh as the 
authorities can not remain silent spectators when exchange rate wildly gyrates. 
 
•  The present exchange rate regime in Bangladesh has served the country quite well. No 
major misalignment with equilibrium exchange rate has occurred and real effective 
exchange rate has not been allowed to appreciate. There has been satisfactory 
performance in terms of certain key macro-economic indicators such as export growth, 
current account deficit, inflation and remittance by non-resident Bangladeshis. 
 
Finally, it is instructive to bring to the attention of the readers the conclusions of a recent 
study by IMF economists (Mussa, et.al.2000). According to this study, it can be safely 
stated that many developing and transition economies, especially those lacking a well-
developed financial infrastructure including sophisticated financial institutions and broad 
and deep markets for foreign exchange (Bangladesh certainly belongs to this category), do 
not satisfy the requirements for a successful float. 
 
In a different context, another IMF study specifically devoted to Bangladesh stated "Given 
such pros and cons, the choice of exchange rate regime is not clear-cut. What matters is a 
set of sound economic policies that remain consistent with any chosen exchange rate 
regime" (Hossain, 2002, p.23). 
 
At a strictly philosophical level, one can argue that exchange rate is a price and like any 
other price, it should be fully flexible. But to compare the price of foreign exchange which 
affects virtually all sectors of the economy with, let us say, the price of a pair of socks is 
both an intellectual absurdity and a practical folly. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the present exchange rate regime does not have to be a 
permanent fixture. As noted before, the regime that is appropriate for a particular country 
may change over time. However, the realities of the economy of Bangladesh do not seem to 
warrant a change in the economy of Bangladesh in the near future. 
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